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|a 940.53/1
|2 22
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Lacey, Jim,
|d 1958-
|0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2006069124
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| 245 |
1 |
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|a Keep from all thoughtful men :
|b how U.S. economists won World War II /
|c Jim Lacey.
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| 260 |
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|a Annapolis, Md. :
|b Naval Institute Press,
|c [2011], ©2011.
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| 300 |
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|a 266 pages ;
|c 24 cm
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| 336 |
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|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
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| 337 |
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|b n
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|a volume
|b nc
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| 504 |
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|a Includes bibliographical references (pages 244-252) and index.
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| 505 |
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|a Economics and war -- Unmaking the victory program -- The real victory program -- The economists' war -- The production organizations -- The war production board and two wars -- War and feasibility -- The great feasibility debate -- Marshall's commitment to a 1943 invasion of Europe -- Why Marshall changed his mind -- Appendix 1. The feasibility concept -- Appendix 2. The first feasibility study (14 March 1942) -- Appendix 3. Wedemeyer's victory program -- Appendix 4. Nathan's 6 October memorandum for War Production Board meeting -- Appendix 5. General Somervell's comments to War Production Board proposals of 31 August 1942 -- Appendix 6. Simon Kuznets' reply to Somervell's comments on his feasibility proposal (sent under Robert Nathan's hand) -- Appendix 7. Letter from Robert P. Patterson (under secretary of war) to General Somervell, post 6 October feasibility meeting -- Appendix 8. Minutes of War Production Board 6 October meeting.
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| 520 |
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|a Argues that: Lieutenant General Wedemeyer's Victory Program report was not the foundation for strategic planning and munitions production, General George C. Marshall knew that no invasion of Europe was possible in 1943 at the time of the Casablanca conference, President Roosevelt's production goals for US industry were so unrealistic as to be destructive rather than constructive, civilian spending did not represent significant sacrifices by American consumers.
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| 610 |
1 |
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|a United States.
|b War Production Board.
|0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n50060401
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| 650 |
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|a Industrial mobilization
|z United States
|x History
|y 20th century.
|0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008104508
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| 650 |
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|a World War, 1939-1945
|x Economic aspects
|z United States.
|0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008113679
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| 651 |
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|a United States
|x Economic policy
|y 1933-1945.
|0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85140035
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|p Can Circulate
|a Michigan State University-Library of Michigan
|b Michigan State University
|c MSU Remote Storage
|d MSU Remote Storage
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|e HC106.4 .L34 2011
|h Library of Congress classification
|i Printed Material
|m 31293032500245
|n 1
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