Military realism : the logic and limits of force and innovation in the US Army / Peter Campbell.

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"After the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army considered counterinsurgency (COIN) a mistake to be avoided. Many found it surprising, then, when setbacks in recent conflicts led the same army to adopt a COIN doctrine. Scholarly debates have primarily employed existing theories of military bureaucracy or cult...

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Bibliographic Details
Uniform Title:American military experience series.
Main Author: Campbell, Peter P. (Author)
Language:English
Published: Columbia, Missouri : University of Missouri, [2019]
Series:American military experience series.
Subjects:
United States > Military policy.
Military doctrine > United States > History > 20th century.
Military doctrine > United States > History > 21st century.
HISTORY / Military / Strategy.
HISTORY / Military / United States.
Military doctrine.
Military policy.
United States.
1900-2099
History.
Genre:
History.
Physical Description:xvi, 374 pages ; 24 cm.
Format: Book
Contents:
  • Military Realism
  • Flexible Response, the Nuclear Battlefield, and Counterinsurgency: Kennedy and Army Doctrine in the 1960s
  • Army Doctrine in the Shadow of Vietnam: Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 1968
  • From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Cold War Doctrine of the '70s and '80s
  • The Power Projection Army: Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era until the Eve of September 11
  • Transforming under Fire: The Global War on Terror, Counterinsurgency, Iraq, and Operations 2008.